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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TH.E STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18294

WA YNE NEIL HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellanto

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Wayne Neil Harris, was charged with
Production of a Controlled Substance (to wit:

cultivation of

marijuana), a third-degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.,
§

58-37-S(l)(a)(i) (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty after a bench trial

on February 4 and 10, 1982 in the Second Judicial District
Court in and for the County o·f Weber, State of Utah, the
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presiding.

On March 3,

1982, the appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for
an indeterminate period not to exceed five years and fined
$5,000.

He appeals from the judgment and sentence entered

against him.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 27, 1981, Dee Knight, who lived on land
adjoining that of appellant's, contacted the mayor of Farr
West City in Weber County to inform him that he had observed
what he believed were marijuana plants
property (T. 24, 25).1

g~owing

on appellant's

That same day, at one o'clock in the

afternoon, Deputy Anderson of the Weber County Sheriffis
Office (WCSO), accompanied by Trooper Jackson of the Utah
Highway Patrol, arrived at Mr. Knight's residence and spoke
with him about the matter (SH 22, T. 26).

From a vantage

point on his property, Mr. Knight pointed out to Deputy
Anderson the suspected marijuana plants growing in a garden
area some distance from appellant's house (T. 56, 57).
Upon seeing the plants and believing them to be
marijuana (T. 106), Deputy Anderson (who had previous
experience in the identification and seizure of live marijuana
plants (T. 64, 101)), along with Trooper Jackson, pulled his
patrol car into the open entrance of appellant's driveway

lReference to "T. 24," e.g., is to page 24 of the
trial transcript~ reference to "SH 24," e.g., is to page 24 of
the suppression hearing transcript.
-2-
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(T. 55, 65) and walked down it in order to talk with
appellant, who was out working in his yaid (T. 29, 62).
During the conversation with appellant (the exact location of
which is in dispute, but which took place on the driveway or a
very short distance from it (SH 50, 51; T. 62; see Appellant's
Brief, Appendix A), neputv Anderson· saw a number of marijuana
plants in appellant's garden (T. 64).

He then returned to his

patrol car, radioed the WCSO and requested that Detective
Shupe come to appellant's property (T. 64).

Shortly

thereafter, Detective Shupe (who also had experience in the
identification of live marijuana plants {T. 138)) arrived,
joining Deputy Anderson and Trooper Jackson at a point close
to where the latter two officers had initially engaged
appellant.

Appellant was then arrested and the marijuana

plants were siezed (T. 65, 66).

Two days later on June 29,

1981, Detective Shupe returned to appellant's residence with a
search warrant and seized additional evidence (T. 108).
At a suppression hearing prior to trial, Judge
Cornaby denied appellant's motion to suppress the evidence
seized on June 27 and 29 (SH 61).

At trial, he again_denied

appellant's moion to suppress the evidence (T. 184, 185).
Having waived a jury trial (T. 134), appellant was convicted
by Judge Cornaby of cultivating marijuana (a violation of Utah

Code Ann., § 58-37-8{l){a) (i) {1953), as amended), and

-3-
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sentenced to the Utah State Prison (T. 198; Sentencing Hearing
Transcript, p. 15).

On March 3, 1982, the day of the

sentencing hearing, appellant filed a petition for certificate
of probable cause.

The trial court set a hearing on this

petition for March 9, 1982; however, at the appointed time
neither the state nor the appellant showed up for the hearing
( R. 53) •

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED WITHOUT A WARRANT ON
JUNE 27, 1981 AND THAT SEIZED PURSUANT TO
A WARRANT ON JUNE 29, 1981 WAS NOT
INADMISSIBLE AS FRUIT OF AN UNLAWFUL
SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
Appellant's argument concerning the admissibility of
the evidence admitted at trial is twofold.

First, he asserts

that the evidence. seized without a warrant on June 27, 1981
should not have been admitted because it was the fruit of an
unlawful search and seizure.

Second, citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367

U.S. 643 (1961), he argues that because the search for and
seizure of evidence on June 29, 1981 was made pursuant to a
warrant obtained on the basis of evidence and information
garnered from the allegedly illegal search and seizure two
days earlier, the evidence seized on the 29th was also
inadmissible because it constituted "fruit of the poisonous
tree."
-4-
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Given the facts of this case, this Court is
initially confronted with the questions .of whether the
observations made by the police officers on the 27th were
lawful and if they were, whether the lawful observation of the
contraband was itself sufficient to justify the warrantless
seizure.

The answers to these questions will determine the

legality of the officers' conduct on the 27th and thereby
resolve the larger question as to the admissibility of the
evidence seized both on the 27th and 29th (given that
appellant's objection to the search and seizure on the 29th is
based solely on the alleged illegality of the officers'
conduct two days earlier2).
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the
United States Supreme Court said:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own
home, or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.
Id. at 351.

Katz introduced the justified expectation of

privacy· approach for determining whether a place is to be
especially protected against unreasonable police intrusion.

2Appellant suggests that there may have been a
violation of Utah Code Ann., § 77-23-6 (1953), as amended,
which concerns a receipt for property seizea pursuant to a
search warrant; however, he then admits that a violation under
that section would not render the evidence seized
inadmissible.

-5-
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Lower courts interpreting and applying Katz have often relied
on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion therein,3 which
elaborated on the majority opinion as follows:
As the Court's opinion states, "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." Generally, as here, the answer
to that question requires reference to a
"place." My understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for
most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or
statements that he exposes to the "plain
view" of outsiders are not "protected"
because no intention to keep them to
himself has been exhibited. On the other
hand, conversations in the open would not
be protected against being overheard, for
the expectation of privacy under the
circumstances would be unreasonable.

In short, in the present case:
[t]he concern •• ~ is with what police
investigative practices, when directed at
residential premises, do not intrude upon
a protected privacy expectation as to those premises.
LaFave, Search and Seizure:
Amenoment (1978),

§

A Treatise

on the Fourth

2.3, Residential Premises.

3see, e.g., United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217
(9th Cir. 1976); Government of Vir in Islands v. Berne, 412
F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.
6
Peop e v. Berut o,
Ca • Rptr.
217, 453 P.2d 721 (1969).
-6-
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Appellant had no justified expectation of privacy
where the marijuana plants he had growing in his garden were
readily visible to persons on neighboring lands.

See State v.

Lee, Utah, 633 P.2d 48 (1981); State v. Echevarrieta, Utah,
621 P.2d 709 (1980); State v. Wettstein, 28 Utah 2d 295, 501
P.2d 1084 (1972), citing People v. Bradley, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457,
460 P.2d 129 (1969); and Dillon v. Superior Court, 102 Calo
Rptr. 161, 497 P.2d 505 (1972).

As noted in State v. Pontier,

95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969 (1974),
Planting marijuana plants in a back
yard enclosed only by a picket fence and
intermittent vegetation is not an action
reasonably calculated to keep the plants
from observation since it is certainly
foreseeable that a reasonably curious
neighbor, while working in his yard, might
look over the picket fence into
appellant's yard and see the plants,
whether or not he knew what they were.
518 P.2d at 973.

Thus, based on this Court's reasoning in

State v. Lee, supra, wherein it said:
For an officer to look at what is in open
view from a position lawfully accessible
to the public cannot constitute an
invasion of a reasonable expectancy of
privacy.
State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621
P.2d 709 (1980); United States v. Polk,
433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 51, fn. 3.

Deputy Anderson's observation of marijuana

plants growing in appellant's garden from a point on
neighboring land (upon which he had been invited) did not
-~
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constitute a search and was clearly legal.

See also:

State

v. Folkes, Utah, 562 P.2d 1125 (1977); Turner v. State, Tex.
Crim., 499 S.W.2d 182 (1973); Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 108
Cal. Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973).
Appellant's main argument is that the officers'
uninvited entry on appellant's property without a search
warrant and their confiscation of the marijuana plants after
appellant's arrest (all on June 27) constituted an unlawful
search and seizure.

Having been told by a- neighbor that he

had observed what he believed to be marijuana plants in
appellant's garden and having themselves viewed what they
believed to be marijuana plants,4 Officers Anderson and

4Respondent recognizes that the record indicates
that only Deputy Anderson actually knew what live marijuana
plants looked like, but it was not unreasonable for Trooper
Jackson to rely on Anderson's knowledge. Thus, all of
Jackson's actions were also based on a reasonable belief that
appellant was cultivating marijuana plants.
Also, appellant suggests that Dee Knight's
reliability as an informer was suspect because he had never
seen a live marijuana plant prior to observing those in
appellant's garden, and that this in some way further
illegitimatized the officers' conduct. First, Mr. Knight
testified that he had seen pictures of marijuana plants prior
to his observations of appellant's plants (T. 25). Therefore,
he had some idea of how marijuana plants looked. Second, as
People v. Hubbard, Colo., 519 P.2d 951, 953 noted:
When the source of the information is
a citizen-informant who was an eyewitness
to the crime and is identified, the
information is presumed to be reliable,
and the prosecution is not required to
establish either the credibility of the
informant or the reliability of his
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jackson had probable cause to believe that a crime was being
committed and therefore had a legitimat~ purpose in walking
down appellant's driveway, to which the gate was open, in
order to further investigate the matter by talking to
appellant who was out in the yard working.5
Absent express orders from the person in
possession against any possible trespass,
there is no rule of private or public
conduct which makes it illegal per se, or
a condemned invasion of the person's right
of privacy, for anyone openly and
peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the
steps and knock on the door of any man's

information. Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 79 s.ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327
(1959) (additional cites omitted).
This appears to be the view adhered to in Echevarrieta, supra.
SAppellant makes light of Deputy Anderson's
testimony at the Suppression Hearing indicating that he could
not say with certainty that what he saw from Dee Knight's
property were in fact marijuana plants. However, Anderson
consistently maintained that he reasonably believed the plants
he saw were marijuana (SH 26; T. 106). State v. Folkes, Utah,
565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1977), made clear that:
When a police officer sees or hears
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of
crime, he has not only the right but the
auty to make observations and
investigations to determine whether the
law is being violated; and if so, to take
such measures as are necessary in the
enforcement of the law.
Deputy Anderson clearly had a reasonable susp1c1on of crime
which justified his further investigation.

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"castle" with the honest intent of asking
questions of the occupant thereof--whether
the questioner be a pollster, -a salesman,
or an officer of the law.
United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1972),
quoting from Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.
1964).

As noted by Professor LaFave in Search and Seizure,

supra:
Thus, courts have held "that police with
legitimate business may enter the areas of
the curtilage which are impli~dly open to
use by the public" and that in so doing
they "are free to keep their eyes open and
use their other senses."
[State v. Crea,
305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 736 (1975)].
This means, therefore, that if police
utilize "normal means of access to and
egress from the house" [Lorenzana v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973)] for some
legitimate purpose, such as to make
inquiries of the occupant [United States
v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972);
State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d
736 (1975)] • • • , it is not a Fourth
Amendment search for the police to see or
hear from that vantage point what is
happening inside the dwelling (additional
cites and footnotes omitted).
Id. at Vol. I, p. 305.
It follows, thereforP., that officers do not engage
in a search if, for instance, they, from the street, observe
plants in someone's yard or house and then enter on the
property by a driveway or other normal access route to the
house in order to determine if the plants are marijuana.
-10-
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See, e.g., People v. Bradlev, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129
(1969); People v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 165, 70
Cal. Rptr. 362 (1968); People v. King, 5 Cal. App. 3d 724, 85
Cal. Rptr. 461 (1970).
Citing Lorenzana, supra, this Court in Echevarrieta,
supra, adopted these principles, holding that where an officer
"was afforded an implicit invitation to enter upon the
premises via the driveway and from his vantage point thereon,
he observed the growing marijuana

plant~,"

his observation did

not amount to a search in the constitutional sense.
Echevarrieta, supra, at 711.

See also:

State v. Lee, supra.

Hence, in the present case, the officers' act of walking down
appellant's driveway to further investigate a possible crime
by talking to appellant who was at the time out in the yard in
an area toward the end of the driveway, and Deputy Anderson's
subsequent observation of marijuana plants plainly visible
from a vantage point on appellant's driveway (or a point very
close to it)--a place the officer had a legal right to
occupy--did not constitute a search and were clearly legal.
Even if the officers' only purpose for entering appellant's·
property was to confirm their reasonable belief that what they
had seen from the neighbor's land were marijuana plants, their
conduct was clearly leqal.

See People v. Superior Court,

supra.
The only question that remains concerns the
legitimacy of the warrantless seizure of the plants visible
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to the officers from vantage points on and off appellant's
land.

Appellant argues that because there were no exigent

circumstances the officers acted illegally by seizing the
marijuana plants, even though they were in plain view in
appellant's garden, without first obtaining a warrant.
However, under Utah law the warrantless seizure of the plants
was legal as a justified confiscation of evidence in plain
view incident _to appellant's arrest, notwithstanding the
absence of exigent circumstances.
Appellant was arrested without a warrant, which
under the circumstances of this case was lawful and is not
challenged in this appeal.
2(1) (1953), as amended.

See Utah Code Ann.,

§

77-7-

State v. Folkes, supra, held that

where officers could lawfully arrest an individual without a
warrant:
they could take anything in the immediate
area which was so involved in the criminal
conduct that it would serve as evidence in
proof of the crime (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1127-1128.

A further illustration of the proper

operation of this rule in a situation where the police do not
have a search warrant can be found in State v. Austin, Utah,
584

P.2d 853 (1978), where the Court held that police officers

who were authorized to be in a hotel room, although without a
search warrant, properly seized evidence in "plain view" in
the suspects' wastebasket.

Finally, relying on Folkes, this
-12-
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Court in Echevarrieta, supra, held that where an officer,
incident to the defendant's arrest and without a warrant, had
seized several marijuana plants in the ·aefendant 's yard
(plants which were in the immediate area and plain view of the
arresting officer), the seizure was lawful.

The factual

situation in this last case is very similar to that in the
present case, and the differences are not such as to call for
a result here different from the one the Echevarrieta Court
reached. In short, under the doctrine of plain view as it is
applied in Utah (which is consistent with the hoiaing of
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)), the officers'
warrantless seizure of evidence incident to appellant's arrest
was valid.

It must be noted that the officers' seizure was

particularly justified and reasonable since the contraband was
in full view in an area where appellant had little, if any,
reasonable expectation of privacy.

As noted in People v.

Arroyo, Super., 174 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1981), citing Lorenzana v.
Superior Court, supra, there are certain situations:
where a defendant ha[s] conducted his
felonious activity in an area so open to
public view that he could be deemed to
have "implicitly invited" the police to
observe and seize the contraband.
Id. at 682, fn. 2.
In conclusion, the officers' conduct on June 27 was
both reasonable and entirely lawful.

Hence, the evidence

-13-
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seized on that day and the evidence seized pursuant to a
warrant two days later was properly admitted at appellant's
trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
INTO EVIDENCE THE RESULTS OF THE CHEMICAL
TESTS WHICH INDICATED THAT SOME OF THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED WAS MARIJUANA.
Appellant initially argues that the hest evidence
rule required that the color results of ·the Duquenois Levine
test, performed by the state's criminalist technician to
determine whether appellant's plants were marijuana, be
introduced in court instead of the criminalist's testimony as
to the test results.

The best evidence rule, however, is not

applicable in this situation.

The rule is applicable only

where the thing to be proved is the contents of a writing.
State v. Reay, Utah, 368 P.2d 595, 597 (1962); State v. Baker,
Wash., 413 P.2d 962 (1966).

Hayes v. State, Okl. Cr., 397

P.2d 524 (1964) provides a clear, general statement of the
rule:
For the purpose of proving the content of
a writing, the original writing itself is
regarded as the primary evidence, and
secondary evidence is inadmissible unless
failure to offer the original is
satisfactorily explained.
Id. at 527 (Emphasis in original).
-14-
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The Hayes court went on to hold that in a prosecution for
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, the best evidence rule was therefore not applicable to
the defendant's objection to admission of testimony concerning
a blood-alcohol test on the ground that the sample of blood
would be the best evidence.

Accordingly, failure to introduce

the color samples from the chemical test in appellant's case
was not a violation of the best evidence rule.
Appellant's second argument goes to the
interpretation of Utah Code Ann.,

§

58-37-2(24) (1953), as

amended, which states the definition of "marihuana" as it was
rewritten by the Utah Legislature in 1981.

The deletions and

additions made by the Legislature within the pertinent
sentence of that section are as follows:
The words "cannabis" or word "marihuana"
means all parts of the ~l'aifts plant
cannabis sativa L. and cannabis ineicia

...

Laws of Utah 1981, Chapter 75, Section 1.
This amendment simply was an attempt to define
marijuana in a scientifically and legally accurate manner by
eliminating unnecessary references to "cannabis" and "cannabis
indicia."6

In State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955

(1933), this Court fully discussed the history of marijuana

6The Utah Code used the word "indicia"; however,
the more popular spelling appears to be "indica." Respondent
uses the latter spelling hereinafter.
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and the meaning of that term for legal purposes.

Its

conclusion is reflected in the following language from that
opinion:
The plant or drug known as Cannabis
Indica, or Marihuana, has as its parent
the plant known as Cannabis Sativa. It is
popularly known in India as Cannabis
Indica; in America, as Cannabis Americana;
in Mexico, as Cannabis Mexicana, or
Marihuana. It is all the same drug, and
is known in different countries by
different names. It is scientifically
known as Cannabis Sativa, and is popularly
called Cannabis Americana, Cannabis
Indica, or Cannabis Mexicana, in
accordance with the geographical origin of
the particular plant.
Id. at 958-959.

Citing Navaro, Black's Law Dictionary, 5th

Edition, 1979, defines marijuana as:
An annual herb, cannabis sativa, having
angular rough stem and deeply lobed
leaves. • • • A drug prepared from
"cannabis sativa," designated in technical
dictionaries as "cannabis" and commonly
known as marijuana, marihuana, marajuana,
maraguana, or marihuana [sic].

In State v. Romero, 74 N.M. 642, 397 P.2d 26, 29
(1964), the New Mexico Supreme court concluded that:
marijuana is identical with cannabis,
cannabis sativa L., and cannabis indica [
in that] [m] arijuana and cannabis indica
are merely geographically oriented names
of cannabis, whereas cannabis sativa L. is
the botanical name of cannabis.
Other state courts have reached similar conclusions.

See,

e.g., Martinez v. People, 160 Colo. 333, 417 P.2d 485 (1966);
-16-
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State v. Curry, 97 Ariz. 191, 398 P.2d 899 (1965); People v.
Savage, 64 Cal. App. 2d 314, 148 P.2d 654 (1944).
Appellant cites only one case, United States v.
Lewallen, 385 F.Supp. 1140 (W.D. Wisc. 1974), in support of
his assert ion that under Utah Code Ann.,

§

58-37-8 ( 1) (a) ( i)

(1953), as amended, the State had to prove that the evidence
was in fact cannabis sativa L. and not cannabis indica.
holding of that case--which said that because 21
§

The

u.s.c.A.

802 (15) referred only to cannabis sativa L. in defining

marijuana, the government must show that the evidence is
cannabis sativa L. and not cannabis indica or some other
species in order to prove a violation of the law--has been
rejected by every federal circuit court of appeals that has
considered the issue.

See United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d

201 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (see also fn. 12 therein citing other
federal circuit decisions and several state court decisions);
United States v. Dinapoli, 519 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Lupo, 652 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Kelly, 527 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976).

The Tenth

Circuit's opinion in United States v. Spann, 515 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1975) is representative of the position taken by
those courts:
The Walton opinion is most persuasive to
us, reasoning that Congress intended to
outlaw all species of marihuana since all
types possess the toxic agent tetrahydrocannabinol.
·
Id. at 58 2, fn.

4.
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The Utah Leg is la ture' s "cleaning up" of the
statutory language defining marijuana do~s not reasonably
irrlicate that it contemplated immunity from prosecution for
those producing or possessing what is popularly called
cannabis indica.

The Legislature, like Congress, by using the

term "cannabis sativa" to define marijuana intended to outlaw
all species of marijuana, since all types possess
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).

This is evident by the listing of

THC in the schedules of controlled substances in Utah Code
Ann.,

§

58-37-4 (1953), as amendedo

See§

58-37-4(2)(a)

(iii)(T).
In the construction of a statute, the Court must be
controlled by the evident purpose of the Legislature to attain
a certain end.

State v. Navaro, supra.

In short, the

fundamental question which transcends all others is what was
the intent of the Legislature.

Johnson v. Tax Commission, 17

Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966)0

Insuring proper effect to

legislative intent and purpose is a primary consideration.
Parson Asphalt Production, Inc.

Vo

Utah State Tax Commission,

Utah, 617 P.2d 397 (1980): Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.,
Utah, 609 P.2d 934 (1980).

A statute should not be construed

or applied so as to result in incongruous results which were
never intended.
(1964).

Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915

Accordingly, the Legislature's recent amendment of

the definition of marijuana is most reasonably construed as an
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effort to clarify the definition of that term {i.e., by making
the definition scientifically and legal~y correct), and as
intending to include all species of marijuana within the scope
of§ 58-37-8{l){a){i).

In short, given the widely accepted

legal standard that cannabis sativa L. refers to all species
of cannabis and that cannabis sativa L. and cannabis indica
are indistinguishable, the Legislature did not intend to
immunize the production of cannabis indica from prosecution.
Therefore, in appellant's case, the State was not required to
show that the evidence was not cannabis indica; it was
required only to show that it was marijuana, the specific
species being irrelevant.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE
STATE PRISON OR IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT
A CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
Upon conviction of a crime, whether by
verdict or by plea, the matter of the
sentence to be imposed rests entirely
within the discretion of the court, within
the limits prescribed by law.
State v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 450, 453 (1978).
State v. Carson, Utah, 597 P.2d 862 (1979).

see also:

Appellant does

not show nor does the record indicate anything which amounts
to or even suggests an abuse of discretion in this respect.
The trial judge fully considered all the factors relevant to
-19-
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appellant's sentencing before he pronounced the sentence (see
Sentencing Hearing Transcript, po. 14-lS)o
With respect to the denial of appellant's petition
for a certificate of probable cause, as noted in the Statement
of Facts, appellant failed to appear at a hearing set by the
trial court for consideration of the petition.

Having offered

no explanation for not taking the opportunity to present to
the trial court reasons why a certificate of probable cause
should be granted, appellant has no room- to complain of its
denial on appeal to this Court.
POINT IV
UTAH ' S fv'..A RI JU ANA LAWS ARE NOT UN CONS TI TUTIONAL ON THE GROUND THAT THEY DENY
APPELLANT HIS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENTo
Appellant argues that his First Amendment right to
"freedom of religion" is violated by this state's laws
prohibiting the production and use of marijuana.

He claims

that based on the "Bible," the "Book of Mormon," and the
"Doctrine and Covenants," his production and use of marijuana
is justified as a religious practice and is constitutionally
protected.

This position has been soundly rejected in

numerous jurisdictions.

See, e.g., State v. Brashear, 92 N.M.

622, 593 P.2d 63 (1979); Town v. State ex rel. Reno, Fla., 377
So.2d 648 (1979); State v. Soto, Or. Ct. App., 537 P.2d 142
-20-
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{1975): United States v. ·spears, 443 F.2d 895 {5th Cir. 1971).
Cf. Whitehorn v. State, Okl. Cr., 561 P.2d 539 (1977): State
v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973): People
v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
The following from Lewellyn v. State, Okl. Cr., 592
P.2d 538 (1979), wherein the court rejected the claim that
Oklahoma's marijuana laws were unconstitutional because they
do not provide for the use of the drug as a religious
sacrament, is dispositive of appellant's argument:
Religious liberty is not an unlimited
freedom, and while laws cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may inhibit certain acts or
practices. Perfect toleration of
religious sentiment does not include the
right to introduce and carry out every
scheme or purpose which persons see fit.
The religious liberty intended by the
framers of the Constitution is not a
license unrestrained by law. One cannot
stretch his liberty so as to interfere
with that of his neighbor or violate
police regulations or the penal laws of
the land, enacted for the good order and
general welfare of all the people
{footnote omitted).
Id. at 540.
POINT V
APPELLANT WAS REPRESENTED BY EFFECTIVE
COUNSEL AT TRIAL.
Throughout his pro se brief, appellant makes
general allegations that his counsel ineffectively represented
-21-
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him at trial.

However, he points to no specific incident

which adequately supports that claim.
the charge aoes not prove the fact.
560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977).

The mere assertion of
State v. Forsyth, Utah,

The appellant bears the burden of

establishing ineffectiveness, and the proof must be demonstrable, not speculative.

State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918

(1979).
An accused is entitled to:
[T]he assistance of a competent member of
the Bar, who shows a willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the
defendant and present such defenses as
are available to him under the law and
consistent with the ethics of the
profession.
Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 18, 499 P.2d 241, 243 (1969).
This standard has recently been affirmed in State v. Malmrose,
Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982).

Appellant makes no demonstrable

showing that the above standard was not satisfied.
CONCLUSION
Respondent has addressed those issues raised in
appellant's

pro~

brief and the brief submitted in his behalf

by H. Don Sharp, Esq., which it believes merit a response.
For the reasons discussed above, respondent respectfully
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H

submits that the trial court's judgment and sentence should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of November,
1982.
0

~ftj~~ WlM
EARL F. DORIUS

Assistant Attorney General
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